Truth and Semantics
Truth and Semantics
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Deflationary Theories of Properties and their Ontologies
I raise a problem for Hofweber’s nominalist theory of properties. In its stead, I formulate a theory of properties in analogy to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. Although this theory relies on the existence of abstract objects, I argue that nevertheless it is appropriate to call the theory deflationary.
Thomas Schindler
DOI
The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth
Minimalism about truth is one of the main contenders for our best theory of truth, but minimalists face the charge of being unable to properly state their theory. This paper shows how to properly state the theory by appealing to propositional functions that are given by definite descriptions
Thomas Schindler and Julian J. Schlöter
DOI
The Liar Without Relativism
I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.
Poppy Mankowitz
PDF
DOI
Steps to a Minimalist Account 0f Numbers
I try to develop a minimalist view of (natural) numbers in strong analogy to the minimalist view of truth. The idea is that number terms serve a mere quasi-logical function, comparable to the role of the truth predicate. This allows us to explain the applicability and objectivity of arithmetic.
Thomas Schindler
DOI
How to have a metalinguistic dispute
There has been recent interest in the idea that speakers who appear to be having a verbal dispute may in fact be engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation: they are communicating information about how they believe an expression should be used. I propose an independently motivated account where individuals reconstruct metalinguistic propositions by means of a pragmatic, Gricean reasoning process.
Poppy Mankowitz
PDF
DOI
The Modal Logics of Kripke-Feferman Truth
We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results
Carlo Nicolai
,
Johannes Stern
Preprint
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